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Exploring Support as Existential Phenomenon in the Context of Young People 
and Mental Health
by Mona Sommer and Tone Saevi 
Abstract 
Support in different modes, expressions and actions is at the core of the public welfare culture. In this 
paper, support is examined as an everyday interpersonal phenomenon with a variety of expressions 
in language and ways of relating, and its essential meaning is explored. The fulcrum for reflection 
is the lived experience shared by a young woman with mental health problems of her respective 
encounters with two professionals in mental health facilities. A phenomenological analysis of the 
contrasting accounts suggests that, when the professional relationship includes openness and risk, a 
certain degree of freedom of action is possible for both parties involved in the inevitably asymmetrical 
relationship. Support as “given” eludes controllable and measurable objectives, but imposes itself 
on the lived experiences of both the giver and the receiver as subject to readiness for acceptance. 
By not making assumptions about what support is, we open ourselves to the possibility of reciprocally 
experiencing moments revealing the essential meaning of support as lived.
Lived Support 
The increasing rate of mental health problems among 
young people is one of the greatest challenges facing 
public health services in the Nordic societies. Young 
people who are neither studying nor employed and who 
suffer from mental health problems often experience the 
absence of the support they need (Anvik & Gustavsen, 
2012; Kierkegaard, 2016). The term “support” is at the 
very core of mental health services, and a considerable 
amount of research has been devoted to exploring 
initiatives and programmes intended to support persons 
with mental health problems in their everyday lives 
(Bejerholm, Areberg, Hofgren, Sandlund, & Rinaldi, 
2015; Gonzalez & Anvik, 2015; Schindler & Sauerwald, 
2013). Provision such as “supported  employment”, 
“supported education” and “supported housing” is aimed 
at increasing the community engagement of persons 
with mental health problems (Davidson et al., 2001). 
Quantitative studies identify the key characteristics of 
programmes that support individuals in gaining positive 
vocational and educational outcomes and participation 
in community life, such as follow-along support, one-
on-one mentoring, professionals’ availability, integrated 
mental health service and rapid school/work search 
(Bejerholm et al., 2015; Bond, Drake, & Becker, 2008; 
Schindler & Sauerwald, 2013). These characteristics are 
significant determinants at a population level, but they 
do not necessarily determine what support is or what 
support means to the individuals receiving it. Findings 
of qualitative studies exploring first-person experiences 
of support suggest that relationship qualities, flexibility, 
practical help and collaboration are conducive to the 
experience of being supported (Anvik & Gustavsen, 2012; 
Kierkegaard, 2016; Kinn, Holgersen, Aas, & Davidson, 
2014). The question remains, however, whether we can 
come closer to what support is and to how young people 
with mental health issues experience the support provided. 
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We (practitioners, policy-makers, researchers) may think 
that we know the meaning of support because of our 
established interventions and programmes intended to 
provide support and the availability of evidence-based 
knowledge of successful key characteristics. We might 
trust that knowledge, experience and the right method 
or approach ensure effective supportive practices. User 
evaluations reveal satisfied or less satisfied patients, and 
efforts are made to improve programmes and practices. 
We know from practice, however, that practice itself 
brings about experiences that are not always measurable 
or evident in evaluation reports. This paper is aimed at 
contributing to the existing body of knowledge about 
support and moving beyond the aforementioned research 
by exploring the lived experience of support in a 
phenomenological manner. We want to know about 
how support is sensed in the moment of experience – 
before the person reflects on or evaluates it. Are there 
experiential qualities – like sensations, sense of body, 
glance, self, time, space, relation – that can help us 
understand what support is and how it is lived in 
practice? What is the actual lived experience of support? 
What qualities give the supportive act its validity? 
 
This paper is a sub-study of a PhD project exploring the 
phenomenon of support in the lifeworld of young people 
with mental health problems who are fully or partially 
out of the educational and employment contexts. The 
research project consists of three sub-studies exploring 




Support is a human phenomenon that is part of our 
everyday language and experienced in a variety of ways 
in both formal and informal relationships. The dictionary 
definition of the verb “support” points to its general 
meaning as being actively to “bear the weight of”, “prop 
up” or “back”, and as such to “stand by”, something or 
someone in a precarious position or condition in order 
to “strengthen the position of” the other and so “forestall 
sinking or falling back”. Terms such as sustain, bolster, 
buttress, brace are “comparable when they mean to hold 
up either literally or figuratively, although they vary 
greatly in their specific senses and in the range of their 
applicability” (Merriam-Webster, 1992, pp. 800-801). 
Similarly, terms related to a further sense of “support” 
such as uphold, advocate, back, or champion are only 
“comparable when they mean to favour actively and 
in some concrete manner a person or thing that meets 
opposition”.1 In both senses, “support” may thus be 
interpreted as meaning to act in favour of someone or 
something in a circumstantially vulnerable position. The 
word itself is neverthless not explicit about the exact 
nature of the action implied. The prefix “sup”, as the 
assimilated form of sub, means “up from under” and the 
                                                 
1  The  Merriam-Webster Dictionary of Synonyms and Antonyms. 
(1992). Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster. 
Latin root portare means “to carry”.2 In its original 
meaning, to support someone thus literally meant to 
lift up or carry someone upward from a condition of 
below. The closeness of support to life as lived and 
language as spoken “carries a moral force”, van Manen 
says (1990/1997, p. 12). Its moral and relational potency 
is recognized in its multiple synonyms that signify the 
term “support” as a moral act toward someone or some-
thing, and the designation of a specific act, position or 
state of existence. Both the verb and the noun “support” 
connote potentials that reinforce our understanding of 
the complexity of meanings and interpretations of the 
word in contemporary mental health services. For “to 
support” also carries etymological denotations such as 
“to endure and tolerate”, “to furnish sustenance for”, 
“to keep from failing” (Onions, 1966, p. 888), and “to 
enable something to fulfil its function and remain in 
operation”2. The qualitative potential of support is, thus, 
immediately connectable to our experiential sense and to 
the ideals and the aims of good human and professional 
practice, even if these might be taken for granted or even 
forgotten in the natural disarray of everyday practices. 
 
Like most everyday relational (and moral) phenomena, 
support is a ready-to-hand entity in our lifeworld – a 
“thing” that is there in order “to do” something useful 
or suitable (Heidegger, 1926/1962). Support is so close 
to us that it is only in its secondary mode, when it is not 
functioning or loses its usefulness for us, that it stands 
apart and becomes a concern. We give, receive, expect, 
hope for, and have legal or rightful claims to support in 
personal as well as professional relationships in health 
services, education and the legal system. We perform 
support with a view to desired outcomes, and not until 
support becomes a problem – is obtrusive or obdurate 
– do we become aware of it and reflect on how to mend 
it and make it work again. The following accounts of 
support as lived experience exemplify the “taken-for-
granted” or “ready-to-hand” quality that characterizes 
our being inattentively involved with the naturalness of 
daily doing and acting. 
 
Karen is embracing her daughter in farewell. 
Her daughter leans into her. Karen’s arms are 
around her daughter’s body, like so many times 
before. She slackens her grip carefully, moves 
her hands to her daughter’s arms, holds her a 
moment, lets go, and the girl turns around and 
walks away. 
 
In the Book of Psalms, David poetically pro-
claims his confident trust in God as support in 
his fear of being defeated and exterminated 
by his enemies. He says, “Surely God is my 
help; the Lord is the one who sustains me” 
(Psalm 54:4; New International Version). 
 
                                                 
2  www.etymonline.com / support 
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John looks through the window from his seat in 
the restaurant. He is waiting for a friend. Then 
suddenly he sees him on the crowded pave-
ment. People pass by him, rushing ahead. To 
them walking seems easy. John’s friend moves 
slowly. Every step is taken with the utmost 
care and effort. He has multiple sclerosis. A 
pair of crutches supports his steps. 
 
Acceptance of the world as is, our taken-for-granted 
and natural attitude to what happens, stands in contrast 
to the phenomenological attitude that questions what we 
take for real and actively explores the possible human 
experience of things and situations (Sokolowski, 2000). 
The persons in the accounts above experience support in 
the course of living their lives. By exploring support in a 
phenomenological manner, we move from our position 
“within the situation” – from the natural attitude of 
taking for granted, knowing and mastering actions, 
bodies and intentions. We then are no longer in the 
situation of just providing and experiencing support, 
and we can no longer take for granted that we know the 
meaning of what support is or use the word carelessly. 
Supportive professional and personal actions no longer 
come about without consideration of alternatives to 
what we are doing. We are compelled to reflect on the 
greater complexity of the phenomenon. In a sense, a 
phenomenologist knows that s/he is both inside and 
outside of the situation and that thus s/he should dwell 
attentively and be alert to potential ruptures in meanings 
and practices (Saevi, 2013b). A phenomenologist always 
is in a position of not knowing exactly, and therefore 
must ask what this phenomenon actually is. As Merleau-
Ponty (1948/1997) asserts, the human being “is made of 
the same flesh as the world” (p. 248) and is shared and 
reflected by the world. This interconnectedness creates 
a “pregnancy for possibilities” (p. 249), which allows 
for a complexity of interpretations and understandings 
of phenomena in life. Whilst no researcher can wring 
from any phenomenon what it in reality is, “our” own 
phenomenon, support, has ceased to be simply a familiar 
and taken-for-granted part of life and now is a complex 
question. We are now attentively aware that we do not 
know the exact answer. This deconstructive practice “is 
an ethic-sensitive openness toward that which comes 
into being as it comes into being, and a practice of 
writing that intends responsibly to respond to the 
possibility of the otherness of the phenomenon and of 
the other” (Saevi, 2013b, p. 7). 
 
The phenomenological attitude of heuristic wonder about 
concrete meaning is pointed to by Merleau-Ponty (1945/ 
2002) as, paradoxically, an attempt to avoid a one-sided 
cognitive knowing, balanced by an awareness of the 
sensational and bodily way of experiential knowing. 
Ultimately, thus, “The world is not what I think, but 
what I live through” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002, pp. 
xvi-xvii). We recognize support in the moment of pre-
reflective experience, and thus somehow unknowingly 
“know” what support is. We know experientially and 
can distinguish support from what is not in the moment 
it is lived. This immediate embodied and sensational 
experience of support is what constitutes the starting 
point for our inquiry, reflection and interpretation. 
 
To Explore Experience 
 
The attempt to explicate the meaning of things, events 
and actions as we live them, rather than as we “know” or 
conceptualize them, evolves from the insight that to 
understand is to experience existence rather than to 
explain or rationalize reality in an epistemological 
manner (Levinas, 1987/1993). The way the researcher 
understands the phenomenon under investigation is a 
kind of practical experience of the world and of him- 
or herself in the world. Van Manen (1990/1997, p. 25) 
defines phenomenology as “on the one hand, description 
of the lived-through quality of lived experience, and on 
the other hand, description of meaning of the expressions 
of lived experience”. Description of the lived-through 
experience inheres immediately in the living of the 
experience in the moment, while description of the 
meaning of the expression of the lived experience is 
mediated by the symbolic form, the words, we use to 
describe the situation. In other words, the experience of 
support as lived-through is prior to an interpretation of 
the meaning of support in practice and reflection about 
practice. However, the immediate lived-through moment 
is not accessible beyond the moment when it was lived-
through. Thus, when a person retrospectively describes 
an experience, she or he recalls the immediateness of the 
moment in the encounter between memory and language, 
an encounter that of necessity is partly obscure. 
 
Instances of support in practice – support as experienced 
within human relationships – might support our under-
standing of what support is. While subjective experience 
may inhere in the researcher’s prior access to the 
phenomenon, lived experience descriptions are the 
alpha and omega of phenomenological investigations. 
Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2002) “as it is” ranks any science 
secondary to human experience. He says: “looking for 
the world’s essence is not looking for what it is as an 
idea once it has been reduced to a theme of discourse; 
it is looking for what it is as a fact for us, before any 
thematization” (p. xvii). The simple fact of support 
evident in practice is that support is not necessarily 
experienced as supportive. The situation might hold the 
potential of support, but the potential is not always 
realized, and the experience of support, therefore, is 
not the only possible consequence of a supportive act. 
The experience of being supported or not is different 
from the experience (or intent) of providing support. 
How effectively what is intended as support achieves its 
intent is closely related to the receiver’s experience of 
the situation. This insight challenges professionals’ use 
of procedures that are believed to be supportive, but that 
may, in fact, not be perceived as such by the receiver. 
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The lived experience of support seems to be inextricably 
connected to the qualities of the relationship of support, 
and it embeds possibilities for a variety of alternative 
actions. The relation as middle ground – meeting place, 
forum, even fulcrum – is where those comprising the 
relationship address and are addressed by actions, ideas, 
events and interests initiated in or by the situation. The 
relationship is the spatial distance or nearness between 
persons, but the space is not neutral ground in terms of 
how potential relational qualities unfold. All kinds of 
relationships can happen: close or distant, authoritative 
or managerial, open or controlled, caring or uncaring, 
encouraging or dispiriting, and so on. How the parties 
involved experience the relationship in the moment, and 
in particular the one most conditioned by or subject to 
the influence of the relationship itself, is at the very 
centre of our interest. Are some ways of relating more 
supportive than others? 
 
Because the beginning and end of phenomenological 
inquiry is the lived experience of the phenomenon under 
investigation, we asked young people with mental health 
problems what it is like to be supported. The personal 
views or opinions of the participants are not our concern. 
Rather, our focus is on the participants’ articulation of 
concrete examples of support that allow for exploration 
of the phenomenon and the uncovering of structures 
that constitute the lived meaning of support. We present 
two examples of the lived experience of professional 
support recounted by a young woman and explore their 
singular and transcendent meanings. 
 
Support as Lived Relationality 
 
In the first example, Olivia3, one of the participants in 
our study, meets with a therapist in a mental health out-
patient unit. At the point of their meeting Olivia has been 
out of school for two years, and had recently attempted 
to commit suicide. She says: 
 
I was sitting in her office – an unfamiliar place. 
I felt like a stranger. She was looking in my 
journal continually. She was reading about me. 
Then she said, still looking in the journal, 
“So, you’ve had a suicidal attempt. You are 
severely depressed and you have a moderate 
level of anxiety. I see that you have dropped 
out of school.” At that moment, I mentally cut 
off. She went on talking about depression scales 
and symptoms and consequences. I felt like a 
category. Someone outside of myself. A not 
me. She was the one knowing things, and she 
told me about me. I was just supposed to listen. 
 
We immediately sense that this is not a good situation 
for Olivia. She feels objectified, disengaged, and bad 
about both herself and the situation. The relationship is 
                                                 
3 “Olivia” is a pseudonym. 
professional and factually asymmetric (see Skjervheim, 
1992). The uneven power balance between the parties 
preconditions the relationship, and the asymmetry can 
be levelled only in the moment of action. This does not 
happen for Olivia with the therapist. As readers, we 
might feel upset by the therapist’s focus on medical 
facts and her lack of involvement in the present relation 
with her young patient. The uneven power relationship 
indicates a moral and relational dilemma as long as 
the professional does not responsibly respond to the 
power inequality. The relational situation as it appears 
does not provide room for support to happen. 
 
A few weeks later, Olivia meets Ann, a mental health 
worker in a community service for young people. She 
describes their encounter as follows: 
 
Ann and I went to a café, and she bought coffee 
and sandwiches for us. She was just so nice to 
me. We talked about normal things, such as what 
I like to do. She also told me a little about herself. 
She watched me gently, and attentively leant 
toward me across the table when I talked, as if 
she did not want to miss a word. I felt that she 
cared about me. I could see it in her eyes. I told 
her things that I normally feel bad talking about. 
However, with her it was easy to tell things. It felt 
like being with a caring friend. She made me feel 
like a normal person rather than a problem. 
 
The two situations reflect very different ways of being 
together and a different awareness of the asymmetry of 
the relationship. The second situation might have greater 
appeal to our positive feelings about how a young 
person in need of support should be met with care by 
professionals. Some of us might immediately associate 
with Ann’s real interest in Olivia as a person, and 
instinctively identify with Olivia’s expressions of being 
more comfortable in an ordinary environment like a café 
rather than in a professional office. Olivia’s experience 
in both of these situations, undoubtedly, is true as 
subjective experience. She describes the relationship 
with Ann as supportive, in contrast to the event at the 
therapist’s office, which she senses as not supportive. 
But can we trust her experiences? The question hits to 
the core of phenomenology and the status of subjective 
experience in research (van Manen, 2014). In pheno-
menology, subjective experience is true as experience, 
but it cannot claim to be generalizable. Phenomenology 
never generalizes. It systematically thematizes the multi-
tude of diverse human experiences of the phenomenon 
under investigation in order to identify its invariable 
structure. A phenomenological exploration attempts to 
uncover in richly vivid detail the lived experience of a 
phenomenon in order to identify meanings that belong 
explicitly to this particular phenomenon, in this case, 
“support”. “Support” shows itself to human experience 
in real life situations, although in bits and pieces, 
always partly hidden like the Greek hint at with their 
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term “Aletheia”. The paradox is that our access to the 
phenomena of the world is possible only through an 
interpretation of experience, reflection and language. 
The link between the two examples is that some kind 
of support is intended from the professionals in both 
situations. The subjective experiences of this young 
woman present potential access to her lifeworld and 
to her ways of expressing how these relationships are 
experienced. The obvious thought is that, in the concrete 
relationship between the person and the professional, 
the very relationship seems to “speak” directly to the 
receiver of support (as also to the writers and readers of 
this text), whether the professional intends this or not. 
 
Support Speaks in the Relationship 
 
The therapist presents things about her as if she actually 
knows her, Olivia says: “She was the one knowing things, 
and she told me about me”. The therapist acts according 
to her prescribed role and accomplishes the diagnostic 
assessment, evaluates the results, and suggests appro-
priate treatment. Nevertheless, young people like Olivia, 
as well as others, need to be noticed. Interestingly, to 
be “noticed” derives from the Latin notitia, and means 
to “be known” or “acquainted” (Onions, 1966, p. 615). 
To be attentively known by the other is what people 
tend to hope for when they meet others, including 
professionals, and, consequently, what they most want 
when it is missing. In the same way as seeing at times 
may see too little, like when it is blinded or oblivious 
and does not see the other in ways that he or she needs, 
seeing might also at times be too “seeingly” (Saevi, 
2005). Professional seeing, which is more than the 
physical exercise of the eyes, may see too much. In 
Olivia’s case, the therapist sees more than is experienced 
as appropriate, and the young woman feels that the look 
penetrates her. The experience of the look is painful. 
The description discloses that the therapist sees Olivia 
with a diagnostic lens in order to classify her. The word 
diagnosis derives from the Greek word meaning “to 
discern”, and the root gnosis means “a knowing”.4 The 
therapist discerningly comes to know Olivia through her 
diagnostic lens. The young woman’s mental state is fixed 
and presented in a diagnosis. This is a different knowing 
than the experience of being known or acquainted with 
someone – the experience that Olivia misses in the first 
situation but senses in the second. A diagnostic knowing 
sees too much – it screens the other, almost like an x-
ray – and when someone or something is seen through, 
there is no need for wonder. The peculiar thing is that 
the moment of seeing too much also might entail seeing 
too little. Olivia needs to be seen as a normal person – 
not as a problem or a diagnosis. However, this time she 
is disappointed. The therapist’s “knowing” glance sees 
only her problem and misses Olivia. 
 
We learn from Levinas (1947/1987, Pt. IV) that, despite 
                                                 
4 www.etymonline.com / diagnosis 
the separation between self and other, there can be no 
relation to the other that is not at the same time a relation 
to the self. This apparent paradox calls into question the 
very complex event of being present as oneself and 
simultaneously being present to the other. Large (2015, 
p. 23) clarifies this as follows: “The two terms of the 
relation, self and other, relate to one another and at the 
same time are separate from one another”. There is no 
shortcut to escape this complex and contradictory 
challenge in professional practice. Sartre claims that, 
when I am fully absorbed in something, I am conscious 
only of the moment and not of myself (Sartre, 1943/ 
1956, p. 348). In moments of absorbed attention, my 
presence, while not sensed by me, may still be sensed by 
the other person who is sharing the moment with me. I 
am somehow present to the other, but not to myself. 
This is so with Olivia and the therapist, as well as with 
the health care worker. In moments of absorbed atten-
tion, they lose themselves to the Other. In the present 
absorbedness, they do not make judgments about the 
Other, but are lost, each into the Other. The Other, 
however, sees their presence, and might pass judgment 
on them. How are Olivia and the professionals seeing 
each other’s presences and are they judging each other? 
The therapist diagnoses Olivia, which infers judgment. 
Olivia, in turn, feels that she is not being treated in an 
acceptable way. She feels judged, and she judges the 
therapist (in her heart) as a non-supportive person; in 
contrast, she judges Ann as being a supportive person. 
 
Although Olivia did not explicitly ask for support, it is 
to be assumed that something in her might be oriented 
toward wanting to be supported. It therefore seems as if, 
by explaining symptoms and diagnostic features, the 
therapist puts her faith in Olivia’s reasoning. Rationality, 
however, is not always the basic motivation for change 
and development, and nor for the experience of support. 
Examining the educational experience, Bollnow (1962/ 
1989) notes that there has to be something present in 
the young person that is oriented toward development 
and that somehow asks for support. Young people, like 
Olivia, have to be ready for support and ready to learn 
something new about themselves in order to be not only 
open to, but susceptible to, the professional’s advice. 
Of course, this existential readiness is seldom in the 
consciousness of the young person, and often not even 
in the consciousness of the professional. Moreover, being 
ready for learning might be less of a cognitive question 
than a question of relational tone and climate. Bollnow 
(1962/1989) puts it like this: 
 
Readiness to be educated is definitely not rooted 
in the intellect; rather it is founded on the deeper 
and therefore much more securely progressive 
spirit of a morning-like atmosphere. Accordingly, 
education must take this notion as its starting 
point: it should orient itself to the perfection of 
this spirit by guarding it and rebuilding it time 
and again when it is being destroyed. (p. 21) 
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Even though the therapist might have good intentions, 
just as the situation has the potential to be supportive, 
Olivia does not feel supported. What was not present 
in the situation was the “morning-like” atmosphere of 
hope and relief, as well as space for mutual openness to 
the possibilities of her present life opportunities. The 
therapist did not see the significance of the relational 
atmosphere and the young woman’s need for the sensed 
presence of no judgment or the freedom of a more equal 
power balance, and thus the moment lost its supportive 
potential. 
 
In the other professional encounter, Olivia experiences 
the good atmosphere of “being with a caring friend”. 
Ann’s tone, how she speaks, how her body is oriented 
toward Olivia, the look in her eyes, the exchange of 
questions and responses, the rhythm of the conversation, 
all seem to resonate with Olivia. She senses herself as 
a normal person, not as a person with problems, and 
she feels supported. How can we understand Olivia’s 
different experiences in terms of support or not support? 
  
Support as Latent Possibility 
 
Recalling that the word “support” originates from the 
Latin supportare – sub + portare – “to carry up from 
under”, again brings the asymmetry of a relationship of 
support to the fore. All the same, the meaning still is 
consistent with the connotations of support mentioned 
initially, and with our sense that the professional in an 
asymmetric relationship is responsible for his or her 
responsibility for how power is exercised in his or her 
practice (Saevi, 2015; Skjervheim, 1992). If we look at 
equivalents for the word support, however, dilemmas 
arise that are worthy of closer attention. To start with, 
the noun “support” bears the meaning of “protection” 
and a sense of “bearing of expense”. To protect someone 
from something and to carry the costs of something for 
someone are responsible acts that include the risk of 
failure, not only for the one supported, but also for the 
supporter. Care of another from that which threatens 
might cost effort, will and persistence. Does this address 
the encounter between Olivia and her two counsellors? 
 
Every relation between persons implies a multitude of 
potential actions and intentions. The “alternatives are 
connected to the values we find important in our lives” 
(Saevi, 2013a, p. 237) and these values inevitably seep 
into our practice. Due to the complexity of values and 
the temporal and experiential dimensions of life, our 
values evade our full conscious control, and are often 
so close to our way of life that we fail to see them. In 
this regard, Heidegger (1942-43/1992) says: 
 
Because the closest is the most familiar, it needs 
no special appropriation. We do not think about 
it. … . The closest appears therefore as if it were 
nothing. We see first, strictly speaking, never the 
closest but always the next closest. (p. 135) 
What is closest to us thus tends to be that which we 
overlook and forget. The values that constitute our life 
are often not reflectively willed or planned. Existence 
and language need no special appropriation, Heidegger 
claims, but are passed over in silence, as if they were 
“nothing”. Existential values underlying the responses 
to Olivia in the two situations described are not fully 
accessible to the two professionals, and nor to us as 
authors and readers. Nevertheless, we have no reason 
not to assume that both intended to give some kind of 
support to the young woman, even though the intentions 
are not fully reflected in the examples presented. 
 
Weil (1990) offers a moral supplement to Sartre’s 
observation by addressing the human potential to be 
attentive to others rather than to judge his or her actions. 
“Warmth, kind-heartedness and compassion are not 
enough” (p. 77), she says: 
 
The thought must first be hesitatingly expectant, 
empty, not searching for anything, but ready to 
be given to the object as it appears in its naked 
truth. (p. 75) [authors’ translation] 
 
Attention without judgment is required to do the other 
person justice. To give support or to sustain carries the 
synonymous meaning of the verb “to suffer” or “endure”. 
It is logical that the one who is in need of support 
endures suffering in some form. We believe that Olivia 
suffers and is deprived of the life she desires. At least 
she did. That is why she is in her present situation. To 
sustain someone, however, has to do with seeing this 
person’s pain. The provider of support is supposed to 
see the pain of the other and to do something to ease it. 
Judgment is replaced by attention to the exposedness of 
the other and to how the moment might ease his or her 
suffering. We might, however, be too eager to fill the 
moment with rational meaning. We might endeavour to 
explicate who the Other is in order to explain why help 
is required. This leaves us with judgments and thoughts 
rather than with attention to the present moment and the 
attempt to ease suffering (Weil, 1990). 
 
Levinas (1947/1987) introduces yet another paradoxical 
aspect to our reflection. He claims that the attitude of not 
knowing the other, recognizing the other as unknowable, 
is the most radical foundation of any relationship: “We 
recognize the other as resembling us, but exterior to us; 
the relationship with the other is a relationship with a 
Mystery” (p. 75). The insight that the other is as me, 
and yet radically different from me, addresses the aspect 
of the freedom of both. The freedom of not knowing 
(agnosis) frees from judgment. Not knowing keeps open 
the possibilities and allows room for wonder. We 
nevertheless cannot not know forever. At some point in 
a relationship, we do know what we did not know 
before. How then do we act? Our exploration of possible 
meanings from Olivia’s experience suggests that a 
supportive act inheres in both knowing and not knowing. 
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Knowing as a passive activity; a knowing that is open 
to not knowing; a knowing that knows the limitation 
of knowing and the potential of not knowing. We might 
say that the paradox of knowing and not knowing 
indicates the openness of a new “method”. 
 
Support as Being Present in Presence 
 
The obvious, but not always considered, basis of human 
experience is that every human being experiences life-
situations differently. This is true both for the person 
providing and for the person receiving support. Both 
experience themselves, the other’s way of being and 
behaving, and the situation as such, immediately and 
pre-reflectively, and these experiences are simultaneous 
and interwoven (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002). To the 
professionals as well as to the young woman, Olivia, 
sensations, feelings and impressions are evoked in the 
mutual encounter before there is time for conscious 
reflection. They both sense the present situation bodily 
and emotionally. Heidegger’s term “Befindlichkeit” – 
how I “find myself” – indicates our pre-reflective sense 
of self in the particular moment of experience. Gendlin 
(1978-1979) suggests that to “find oneself” in the 
present is not a clear-cut and rational reflection, but a 
stumbling attempt to describe the situation as it really 
was. At a particular moment during the encounter with 
the therapist, an alien sense of self comes over Olivia, 
and she says, “I felt like a stranger”. The adjective 
“strange” connotes the words “separate” and “distant”.5 
The noun “stranger” is synonymous with “unknown”. 
Translated to our context, Olivia seems to feel that she 
is not connected, she is distant, even unknown to the 
therapist in spite of the fact that the therapist presents 
relevant information from her treatment journal, and 
they are present in the same room sitting directly 
opposite one another. The experience of being known to 
someone has to do with a sense of being recognized or 
remembered – of being called to mind or acknowledged 
by someone. There would seem to be an experiential 
connection between the experience of support and the 
experience of being recognized. The therapist relates 
to Olivia, talks to her and, through this, she somehow 
acknowledges her presence. Olivia, however, states 
that she feels strange in the situation. Somehow, the 
presence of the professional does not make itself felt 
to Olivia. Their joint presence is present to Olivia in a 
non-present way. Being jointly physically present is 
not enough to convey the true presence. For Olivia, real 
presence is absent from the presence with the therapist. 
Marcel (1950) observes that we very rarely experience 
presence in itself as presence, but rather as something 
else present or absent. If something intrudes upon our 
ordinary habits, such as pain or illness, our everyday 
taken-for-granted sense of being is interrupted. The lived 
absence of wellbeing and non-pain disturbs our present. 
What is it that disturbs Olivia’s presence with the 
                                                 
5 www.etymonline.com  / strange 
therapist? Marcel (1950) relates the experience of non-
presence to the subject’s sense of being alienated from 
him-or herself. He says: 
 
One might say that what we have with this 
person, who is in the same room, but somehow 
not really present to us, is communication with-
out communion: unreal communication, in a 
word. He understands what I say to him, but he 
does not understand me: I may even have the 
extremely disagreeable feeling that my own 
words, as he repeats them to me, as he reflects 
them back at me, have become unrecognizable. 
... this stranger interposes himself between me 
and my own reality, he makes me in some 
sense also a stranger to myself; I am not really 
myself while I am with him. (p. 205) 
 
Perhaps Olivia’s journal and her diagnosis are taking up 
the space between Olivia and the therapist. The therapist 
communicates with Olivia using professional language 
and tools. This does not necessarily have to be a problem. 
Sometimes a computer screen or a treatment journal 
does not disturb the communication, but supports it as 
some kind of catalyst enhancing their shared focus. In 
this particular setting, however, Olivia’s experience of 
reality does not coincide with the therapist’s professional 
orientation. The potential for either fellowship or trustful 
communion between them is thus literally reduced to 
professionally prescribed forms. There is no communion 
in the communication. The word “communion” derives 
from the Latin prefix com-, “with or together”, + unus, 
“oneness or union”. Communion literally means the 
experience of oneness or togetherness. What then is the 
connection between the experience of togetherness and 
the experience of being present? According to Marcel 
(1950), presence is not real before the communication 
is communion. In terms of support, one possibility is that 
support makes itself possible when I recognize myself 
as myself in communion with the other. 
 
In all encounters, we are faced with the challenge to see 
the person beyond the role. Lingis (1994) notes that we 
tend to feel that to know someone is to relate to their 
representative features, like gender, culture, education, 
class, and, we might add, diagnosis. Encounters often 
tend to be “detoured into efforts, even more evidently 
fragmentary and superficial, to know all these layers”, 
(Lingis, 1994, p. viii). Ann, the mental health worker, 
cuts through the conventions and the superficialities of 
diagnoses, professional role and differences, and sees 
Olivia as a person. She speaks to Olivia personally. We 
sense that, before she is physically and mentally with 
Olivia in the café, she is existentially for her. Support 
as a possibility arises in the presence of the situation, 
and orients beyond conventions and impersonal tasks 
(Saevi & Eikeland, 2012). The therapist, on the other 
hand, is trapped in conventional language, tools, roles, 
professional judgments and past problems. Her effort 
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is to know all these layers, present them to Olivia, and 
start from there. However, Olivia is not there any more. 
Her presence is in the present, and her life is lived in 
continuously new moments where presence is what is 
asked for. Because support is lived in interpersonal 
relationships made up of no more and no less than my 
spontaneous response to the other person’s need present 
to me in the immediate moment, what is asked for is an 
immediate attentive response to ease the other’s pain 
as it presents itself in the moment. 
 
Support as a Future Gift 
 
Considering the basic terms of Løgstrup (2008), support 
might be seen as a “sovereign expression of life” (p. 
50). He says: “The sovereign expression of life draws 
its content from the specific situation and the relation to 
the other, which is to say, from my conception of that 
situation and relation, of their actual circumstances 
and history” (p. 52). Support, as a spontaneous response 
to what the situation asks for, emerges in the very 
moment of joint presence. Support exists only in the 
context of the relationship. It is a potential in practice 
that is characterized by embodied-being-in-the world, 
and in the relationship and in action, rather than being 
explicitly known or formalized as concept or preplanned 
practice (van Manen, 1999). Support, as a sovereign 
life expression, is related to what is right and good in 
the present situation, rather than to what is reasonable 
and professionally correct. “The expression of life 
cannot be applied, but can only be realized, as I realize 
myself in it” (Løgstrup, 2008, p. 53). Support, then, is 
a gift given with no ulterior motive or expectation of 
reciprocity or services in return. No thankfulness or 
enthusiasm is presupposed. Not even the willingness of 
the other to improve, get well or succeed. What is given 
is a gift and belongs to the other, the receiver, and 
cannot be taken back or reclaimed. Literally, the word 
gift means “that which is given”, and in Old Norse a 
gift given means “good luck” in life. Support, also 
professional support, can be regarded, in a sense, as a 
personal gift given by the supporter, but belonging to 
the receiver as a future gift. Olivia recognizes Ann’s 
support as a gift, and accepts it. The gift is receivable 
and merges into Olivia’s self and lifeworld as a welcome 
possibility that she acknowledges as such. 
 
As relational human beings who have the opportunity 
to give and receive support, there is always a risk that 
support might not be experienced as supportive. The 
giver of support might fail to recognize the kind of 
support that the situation asks for, the receiver does 
not get the support s/he needs, or the receiver might 
not be ready to receive that which is given. Support as 
gift is not an object to be transferred between a giver 
and a receiver, because the objectification of support 




Examining support as an everyday interpersonal, and 
thus moral, phenomenon, revealed existential meanings 
of support that may be useful for practice. By bringing 
embodied experiences into the foreground, support shows 
itself as a phenomenon that does not let itself be used 
to promote specific outcomes. Support exists as a free 
phenomenon, given or not given, accepted or ignored, 
and experienced as good or not good in the concrete 
situations where it is present. Support is not manifest or 
determined, and cannot be offered as a settlement for 
results, better mental health, or increased participation 
in school or work. Preplanned models, programmes or 
agreements of support should be recognized as, in 
themselves, potentially supportive, but not sufficient as 
such for support in fact to be given. 
 
On the basis of our analysis, we would argue that some 
ways of relating are more supportive than others. To 
be attentively known by the giver of the support, and 
knowing with an open and non-judgmental attitude, 
holds the potential for support to be both given and 
received. This existential insight invites professionals 
to bring themselves into the encounters as authentic 
persons, disclosing their vulnerability, and to trust 
uncertainty as a way of being open to the Other and to 
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